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PROSECUTION OF UNLICENSED FLYING
CASES
FRED D. FAGG, JR., and LEO FREEDMAN*
Forty-five states now require licenses for aircraft and airmen
operating within their boundaries and, in a majority of the states,
a federal license is required.' Unlicensed flying is made a mis-
demeanor and is punishable by fine, imprisonment, or both. A
typical statutory provision requiring a federal license for all air-
craft and airmen is that of Illinois,2 as follows:
"Sec. 2. Aircraft: Construction, design, and airworthiness: Federal
License: The public safety requiring and the advantages of uniform regu-
lation making it desirable in the interest of aeronautical progress that air-
craft operating within this State should conform with respect to design,
construction, and airworthiness to the standards prescribed by the United
States government with respect to navigation of civil aircraft subject to its
jurisdiction, it shall be unlawful for any person to operate any aircraft
within the State unless such aircraft has an appropriate effective license,
issued by the Department of Commerce of the United States, and is reg-
istered by the Department of Commerce of the United States; Provided,
however, that this restriction shall not apply to military aircraft of the
United States, or public aircraft of any state, territory, or possession thereof,
or to aircraft licensed by a foreign country with which the United States
has a reciprocal agreement covering the operation of such licensed aircraft.
"Sec. 3. Qualifications of pilots: Federal license: The public safety
requiring and the advantages of uniform regulation making it desirable in
the interest of aeronautical progress that a person engaging within this
State in navigating aircraft in any form of navigation, shall have the quali-
fications necessary for obtaining and holding a pilot's license issued by the
Department of Commerce of the United States, it shall be unlawful for
any person to operate any aircraft in this State unless such person is the
holder of a correct, effective pilot's license issued by the Department of
Commerce of the United States: Provided, however, that this restriction
shall not apply to those persons operating military aircraft of the United
States, or public aircraft of any state, territory, or possession thereof, or
operating any aircraft licensed by a foreign country with which the United
States has a reciprocal agreement covering the operating of such licensed
aircraft.
*Mr. Freedman is a student at Northwestern University Law School.
1. F. D. Fagg, Jr., "The Trend Toward Federal Licensing," 2 JOURNAL
OF AIR LAW 542, and see also, Fagg, "A Survey of State Aeronautical
Legislation," 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 452.
2. An Act to Regulate Aeronautics, approved July 9, 1931; Laws of
Illinois, Fifty-seventh General Assembly, 1931, p. 194; Smith-Hurd Illinois
Revised Statutes, 1931, ch. 15V.
[5151
THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
"Sec. 19. Penalty: Any person failing to comply with the require-
ments of, or violating any of the provisions of this Act, or the rules and
regulations for the enforcement of this Act made by the Illinois aero-
nautics commission, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable by a
fine of not more than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment for not
more than ninety days or both."
While it is considered entirely desirable to adopt the federal
standard, for reasons of uniformity and to effect a substantial
saving in money and in administrative duties, most of the states
require state registration of all federal licenses granted to aircraft
and airmen operating within their boundaries-with the rather
general exception of those operating in interstate commerce.8 The
Illinois provision is as follows:
"Sec. 11. Powers and duties of commission: Licenses: * * * Within
the same period (sixty days after the commission is created) all pilots and
owners and/or operators of all aircraft shall register the Federal licenses
of said airmen and of said aircraft in such manner as the commission may
by regulation provide. * * *"
Such a requirement enables the state aviation commission to
maintain its own record of licensed aircraft and pilots, for ad-
ministrative purposes, and serves as a ready reference for the de-
tection of violations. There are, however, certain problems which
arise in connection with unlicensed flying operations and which
flow from the adoption of the requirement of federal licenses.
Suppose, for example, that a report reaches the state aviation
commission to the effect that John Doe has been seen flying a
plane bearing no proper license number. A search of the com-
mission records shows that he is not registered as a licensed pilot
and that the plane identified as having been flown by him is also
not registered. Assuming, of course, that the flight was purely
of an intrastate character, it would appear at once that there has
been a violation of the state law. There is certainly a violation
of the provision requiring state registration; there may be a viola-
tion of the provisions relative to unlicensed flying.
Having examined its own files, the state commission would
then get in touch with the proper district officer (usually the in-
spector) representing the Aeronautics Branch of the Federal De-
partment of Commerce. If that officer reported that no effective
license existed for either pilot or aircraft, the state aviation com-
3. See E. F. Albertsworth "Constitutionality of State Registration of
Interstate Aircraft," 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 1.
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mission would be under obligation to prosecute the party or par-
ties involved for the violations mentioned.4
For the purpose of simplicity, let us assume that the case in-
volves merely an act of flying by John Doe who does not possess
an effective federal pilot's license, and that the plane which he
uses is properly licensed and registered.' The first step in the
prosecution of such a case (assuming that no arrest had been made
at the time of the flight) would be the filing of an information
against the defendant. The information would not have to detail
the specific acts constituting the offense, but would be sufficient if
it charged the violation in the words of the statute.6 Thus, for
4. There is considerable difference in the mode of proof in federal
cases due to the fact that federal suits are in the nature of admiralty pro-
ceedings, while the state statutes make violations a misdemeanor and so
occasion criminal prosecutions.
According to the Air Commerce Act of 1926 (Pub. Acts-No. 254-69th
Congress) Section Ila, it is unlawful "(2) to navigate any aircraft (other
than foreign aircraft) in interstate or foreign air commerce unless such
aircraft is registered as an aircraft of the United States; (3) to navigate
any aircraft registered as an aircraft of the United States or any foreign
aircraft without an aircraft certificate; . . . (4) to serve as an airman
in connection with any aircraft registered as an aircraft of the United
States without an airman certificate ," and Section llb, "any
violation of these provisions . . . shall subject the individual
to a civil penalty of $500 . . . Any civil penalty imposed may be col-
lected by proceedings in personam against the person subject to the penalty
and/or in case the penalty is a lien (against the aircraft) by proceedings in
rem against the aircraft. Such proceedings shall conform as nearly as
may be to civil suits in admiralty . .
In the case of federal action to punish an offender who has failed
to procure a license either for himself or for his aircraft, the prosecution
would be hampered by no technicalities of evidence present in common law
proceedings. The rules for the federal procedure are prescribed by the
United States Supreme Court and approach the system of equity. Hence,
the libel need not state a fact which constitutes a matter of defense, or a
ground of exception to the operation of the law upon which the libel is
founded. Cargo of Brig. Aurora v. United States, 7 Cranch 382 (1913).
"In the cases of The Samuel (1 Wheat. 9) and The Hoppet (7 Cranch 389),
it was observed by this court, that technical niceties of the common law,
as to informations, which are unimportant in themselves, and stand only on
precedents, are not regarded in admiralty informations; the material inquiry
in the latter cases being, whether the offense is so set forth, as clearly to bring
it within the statute upon which the information is founded." The Merino,
9 Wheat. 391 (1824).
5. It is to be noted that the Illinois Act makes the operation of un-
licensed aircraft a misdemeanor. This is broader than the mere navigation
of unlicensed aircraft in that, under the former terminology, it is possible
to prosecute the owner of the aircraft as well as the user, and makes it
possible to get at the party who is financially responsible.
6. In the case of practicing medicine without a license, an information
charging "unlawfully and feloniously practicing a system of treating sick
* I . without then and there having a valid unrevoked certificate authoriz-
ing him to practice . . ." was held sufficient without naming the particular
persons treated or the place where the offense occurred: People v. Cochran,
56 Colo. App. 394, 205 P. 473 (1922) ; People v. Ratledge, 172 Cal. 401, 156
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a violation within the City of Chicago, the information would state
that on a certain specified date, "John Doe did unlawfully oper-
ate an aircraft within the limits of the City of Chicago, State of
Illinois, without at the time being the holder of a correct, effective
pilot's license issued by the Department of Commerce of the United
States, in accordance with Section 3 of an Act to Regulate Aero-
nautics, approved July 9, 1931, contrary to the form of the Stat-
ute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and
dignity of the People of the State of Illinois."
At the trial, it becomes the duty of the prosecution to estab-
lish the evidence necessary to obtain conviction. At the outset,
the act of operating aircraft by John Doe must be shown. The
fact of operation could be proved from the testimony of wit-
nesses-either civilian witnesses or a state police officer or officers.
The defendant would be identified as the party doing the operat-
ing. The next obligation on the prosecution would seem to be to
establish the unlawfulness of the operation-the fact that John Doe
held no correct, effective pilot's license at the time the flight oc-
curred. Therefore, it becomes necessary to consider how this fact
can be shown by the prosecution, and to what extent, if any, proof
is necessary. The fact to be demonstrated, if full proof be re-
P. 455 (1916) ; People v. T. Wah Hing, 47 Cal. App. 327, 190 P. 662 (1920);
People v. Mash, 235 Ill. App. 314 (1925) ; People v. Walden, 317 Il. 524, 148
N. E. 287 (1925); People v. Frith, 157 App. Div. 492, 142 N. Y. S. 634
(1913) ; State v. Hickok. 90 Wis. 161, 62 N. W. 934 (1895) ; State v. Hcpkins.,
54 Mont. 52, 166 P. 304 (1917). But see People v. Devinny, 173 N. Y. S.
623, 105 Misc. Rep. '55 (1919), which was reversed, upon appeal, in 227
N. Y. 397, 125 N. E. 543 (1919).
If any exceptions be contained in the statute, they must be negatived
in the information. People v. Talbot, 322 Ill. 416, 153 N. E. 693 (1926). No
allegations need be made, however, concerning a proviso as that is a matter
of defense. As expressed in Elkins v. State, 13 Ga. 435 (1853), "The In-
dictment must in its averments bring the accused within the operation of
law for a violation" so that the defendant will be denied protection under
the exceptions. Or, as in State v. Smith, 157 N. C. 578, 32 S. E. 855 (1911)
where the court quoted Joyce on Indictments, Sec. 279, "The general rule
as to exceptions, provisos, and the like is that when the exception or proviso
forms a portion of the description of the offense, so that the ingredients
thereof cannot be accurately and definitely stated if the exception is omitted,
then it is necessary to negative the exception or proviso. But where the
exception is separable from the description and is not an ingredient thereof,
it need not be noticed in the accusation; for it is a matter of defense."
It is necessary to negative such descriptive exceptions, even though the
burden of proof to establish them may rest upon the defendant: People v.
Devinny, 227 N. Y. 397 (1919) ; State v. Fenter, 204 S. W. 733 (Mo. 1918) ;
State v. Kirkpatrick, 88 W. Va. 381, 106 S. E. 887 (1921). Some cases hold
that if the exception is contained in a separate clause of the statute they
may be omitted in the indictment, but, in any event, the defendant must
show his case comes within the exceptions to avail himself of its benefits:
United States v. Nelson, 29 F. 202 (1886).
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quired, is that the defendant was not the possessor of a proper
license-which can be shown only by the non-existence of a license
issued to the defendant, as determined by a search of the records
and files. These records and files are maintained by the Aero-
nautics Branch of the Federal Department of Commerce at Wash-
ington and are in the custody of a Chief of Registration and a
Sjupervisor of Files. The records maintained by the district rep-
resentative or inspector-located, possibly, in the state in which
the violation occurs-may or may not be complete. They cannot
be considered as the final source of information. The proper
source of information, then, is at the Washington, D. C., office.
It is not feasible to bring the custodian of the federal records
to Chicago, or elsewhere, to testify as to the non-existence of a
license for John Doe. Consequently, it becomes important to de-
termine whether or not the prosecution may offer as evidence a
certificate from the federal official showing that no effective license
is held by the defendant.7
Under common law principles, a custodian of records had no
authority to certify that a specific document did not exist in his
office, or that a particular entry was not to be found in a register.8
Instead, the testimony of the custodian, or the party making the
7. According to English common law, an authority to certify copies
was not to be implied from the nature of a custodian of documents. Ex-
press authority was necessary, either by means of a special or general order
or by statute. In the United States, however, a general principle was
evolved to the effect that "the lawful custodian of a public record has,
by implication of his office, and without express order, an authority to
certify copies." Wigmore, Evidence (2nd Ed. 1923), Sec. 1677. Yet, "it
was settled that no custodian had authority to certify any less than the
entire and literal terms of the original,-and in short, a copy in the strict
sense of the word." Wigmore, supra, Sec. 1678. In these cases, it is to be
noted, the attempt is to show that a certain certificate is on record-not the
absence of such a certificate.
To meet the difficulty of setting out the complete terms of the original,
statutes have been passed which allow the certified copy to contain the
substance of the original. Relative to federal documents, an important
enactment provides that, "copies of any books, records, papers, or documents
in any of the executive departments authenticated under the seals of such
departments, respectively shall be admitted in evidence equally with the
originals thereof." Rev. St. 1878, Sec. 882, Code of Laws of the United
States (1926), Sec. 661, p. 930. An Illinois statute contains a similar pro-
vision with respect to state or territorial records, Smith-Hurd Illinois Re-
vised Statutes, 1931, Ch. 51, Sec. 56.
8. Wigmore, supra, Sec. 1678. There is, however, a minority doctrine,
so far as certificates of the land-office are concerned, to the effect that
certificates of the officers of the land office may be admitted to show that
no warrant or survey, return of survey, or no patent has issued, nor can
be found in their office. Stukers v. Reese, 4 Pa. 129, 131. (1846) ; Ruggles
v. Gaily, 2 Rawle (Pa.) 236; and Weidman v. Kohr, 4 Serg. & R. (Pa.)
174 (1825). See, also, Cross v. Pinckneyville Mill Co., 17 Ill. 54 (1855).
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search, was usually required. Such evidence, of course, might be
contested as oral evidence as to the contents of a documentary
original contrary to the hearsay rule. But since the assumption of
a fulfilment of duty is the foundation of the exception to the
hearsay rule, "it would seem to follow that if a duty exists to
record certain matters when they occur, and if no record of such
matters is found, then the absence of any entry about them is
evidence that they did not occur; or, to put it in another way, the
record taken as a whole, is evidence that the matters recorded, and
those only, occurred."
"The certificate of a custodian that he has diligently searched
for a document or an entry of a specified tenor and has been
unable to find it ought to be usually as satisfactory for evidenc-
ing its non-existence in his office as his testimony on the stand to
this effect would be; and accordingly by statute in a few juris-
dictions custodians' certificates of this sort have been expressly
made admissible."'10 Thus, statutes have been passed in at least
fifteen states which are either general or special in nature and
which authorize the certification of non-existence of a record."
9. Wigmore, supra, Sec. 1633. "Convenience decrees the admittance of
testimony by one who has examined records that no record of a specific
tenor is there contained instead of producing the entire mass for perusalin the courtroom." Sec. 1230, and Wharton, Criminal Evidence, Sec. 160 a.These generalizations are substantiated by case decisions. In Hill v. Bellows,
15 Vt. 727 (1843), a certificate of the town clerk that a certain person had
conveyed no land was held to be incompetent evidence. The proper proof
would have been the statement under oath of the town clerk or some person
who had examined the records. See, also, Cross v. Pinckneyville Mill Co.,
17 I11. 54 (1855), City of Beardstown v. City of Virginia, 81 Il. 541 (1876)
and Mannus-Dewall v. Smith, 139 Okl. 195, 281 P. 807 (1929).
In 22 C. J. at page 1006 it is said: "Where it is sought to prove a
negative, that is, that facts or documents do not appear of record, or that
as to certain acts or proceedings the record is silent, parol evidence is ad-
missible as primary proof; the record is not higher evidence." In Section
1283, the author further says: "That documents or facts do not appear of
record may be proved by the sworn testimony of the person who is legal
custodian of the record, or, it is usually considered, by that of any other
competent person. Some courts have held, however, that the custodian when
accessible is the only competent witness." Quoted in Mannus-Dewall v.
Smith, supra,
10. Wigmore, supra, See. 1678. Italics ours. See footnote 11 for list
of state provisions.
11. CoLoRAO-(Public records).
"That the official certificate of the head officer or acting head officer
or duly appointed deputy of any of the executive departments of the gov-
ernment of the State of Colorado as to the contents of or any fact or
matter shown by its records in his department as well as to facts
not shown by the records of said department and duly certified to as
not existing in the records of said department shall be received and held
in all civil cases as competent prima facie evidence of the facts contained
therein, and of the non-existence of such facts as are duly certified to as
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The majority refer to particular records and would possibly not
authorize certification of the non-existence of aircraft or airmen
licenses. None of the statutes have any specific reference to fed-
eral records. The existence of these statutes would by no means
not existing in the records of such department." (Italics ours.) Com-
piled Laws of Colorado, 1921, Sec. 6551.
IOWA- (Public records).
"Certificate of a public officer that he has made diligent and ineffectual
search for a paper in his office is of the same efficacy in all cases as if such
officer had personally appeared and sworn to 3uch fact." (Italics ours).
Code of Iowa, 1927, Ch. 494, Sec. 11301.
MICHIGAN-(Legal custodian's record).
"Whenever any officer to whom the legal custody of any paper or docu-
ment or record shall belong shall certify that he has made diligent examina-
tion in his office for such paper, document or record, and that it cannot be
found, such certificate shall be presumptive evidence of the facts so certified
in all causes, matters and proceedings in the same manner and with like
effect as if such officer had testified to the same in the court or before the
officer before whom such cause, matter or proceeding is pending." (Italics
ours.) Compiled Laws of Michigan, 1929, Ch. 266, Sec. 14176.
MINNEsTA- (Legal custodian's record).
"The certificate of any officer to whom the legal custody of an
instrument belongs, stating that he has made diligent search for sucK
instrument and that it cannot be found, shall be prima facie evidence of
the fact so certified to in all cases, matters and proceedings." (Italics ours.)
General Statutes of Minnesota, 1923, Sec. 9868.
Mississippi- (Legal custodian's record).
"A certificate under his hand and official seal by an officer to whom
legal custody of a record or paper belongs . . . shall be admissible in
evidence . . ." Mississippi Code of 1930, Ch. 28, Sec. 1566.
NEDRAsxA- (Public records).
Identical with Iowa provision, supra. Compiled Statutes of Nebraska,
1929, Ch. 20, Art. 12, Sec. 1282.
NEW YoRK-(Legal custodian's record).
"Where the officer to whom the legal custody of a paper belongs
certifies under his hand and official seal that he has made diligent examina-
tion of his office for the paper, and that it cannot be found, the certificate
is presumptive evidence of the facts so certified, as if the officer personally
testified to same." Laws of New York, Official Ed. of Civil Practice Acts,
1921, Sec. 366.
NORTH DAKOA-(Board of Dental Examiners).
"A certificate of the secretary under the seal of the board stating that
any person is or is not a registered dentist shall be prime facie evidence
of such fact." Compiled Laws of North Dakota, 1913, Art. 17, Sec. 513.
OHio-(State Medical Board).
"A certificate signed by the secretary of state medical board, to which
is affixed the official seal of the said state medical board to the effect that
it appears from the records of the state medical board that no such cer-
tificate to practice medicine or surgery, or any of its branches, in the State
of Ohio has been issued to any such person or persons specified . .
shall be received as prima facie evidence of the record of such board in any
court or before any officer of this State." Throckmorton's Ann. Code of
Ohio, 1930, Sec. 12694.
RHODE IsLAND--(State Board of Pharmacy).
"A certificate of the secretary of the State Board of Pharmacy and
registrar of pharmacists as to any matter of record of said board, as to
which said secretary may be called upon to testify in his official capacity
shall be admissible evidence in any court of this state of the existence or
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eliminate the possibility of introducing oral evidence of the non-
existence of a particular document. Instead, they make possible-
in certain specifiedi cases-an alternate method which may be
selected according to the convenience of furnishing one or the
other type of evidence.1
2
Realizing, then, the difficulty of proving the non-existence of
a federal airman's license for John Doe by direct testimony of
the custodian of the federal records, and realizing that, in Illinois
and in the majority of the states, no statute permits the estab-
lishing of such proof by certification, it remains that we determine
whether or not the prosecution has the duty to make such a show-
ing, or whether, perchance, the burden of proof 8 is upon the de-
fendant in this particular. Since no cases exist which deal with
aircraft or airmen licenses, resort must be had to cases dealing
with other license questions.
The assertion, in the information, that the defendant operated
an aircraft without possessing a proper license is clearly a nega-
tive averment. And, as this negative matter is a part of the
non-existence of such matter." General Laws of Rhode Island, 1923, Tit.
XVI, Ch. 169, Sec. 2367.
SOUTH DAKOTA-(Board of Dental Examiners).
"Such records or a transcript . . . or a certificate of the secretary
stating that any person is or is not a legally licensed or registered dentist
. . . shall be prima facie evidence in all courts of this state of the facts
therein." Compiled Laws of South Dakota, 1929, Sec. 7749.
TENNESSEE- (Public Records).
Identical with Iowa, supra. Code of Tennessee, 1932, Sec. 9752.
TEXAS- (Corporations).
"A certificate of the Secretary of State to the effect that the cor-
poration named therein has failed to file in his office its articles of incor-
poration shall be evidence that such corporation has in no particular com-
plied with the requirements of this chapter." Revised Civil Statutes of
Texas, 1925, Art. 1535. See, also, the penalty provision, General Laws of
Texas, 1925, p. 264 (H. B. 417).
VERMONT- (Corporations).
"A certificate by the secretary of state that the records do not contain
the name of an organized corporation . . . shall be prima facie evidence
that such corporation ceased to exist." General Laws of Vermont, 1917,
Sec. 1050.
WIscoNsm--(Legal custodian's records).
Almost identical with Michigan provision, supra. Wisconsin Statutes,
1929, Ch. 327, Sec. .09.
12. State ex rel. Leonard v. Rosenthal, 123 Wis. 442, 102 N. WV. 49
(1905) ; Jones v. City of Macon, 135 S. E. 517 (Ga. App. 1926).
13. As to the double meaning of "burden of proof," see Wigm ore,
Evidence, Sec. 2485-2490; and Chas. T. McCormick, "Charges on Presump-
tions and Burden of Proof," 5 No. Car. Law Rev. 291, 305 (1927).
For additional text authority upon the subject of negative averments
and burden of proof, see Wharton, Criminal Evidence (10th ed., 1912), Sec.
341-2; Chamberlayne, Modern Law of Evidence (1911), Sec. 982-4; Bishop,
Statutory Crimes (3rd ed. 1901), Sec. 1051-3; Greenleaf, Evidence (15th ed.
1892), Sec. 79.
PROSECUTION OF UNLICENSED FLYING CASES
state's case against the defendant, it must in some manner be
made to appear at the trial. The difficulty may be aided, in this
respect, by presumption. Bishop has stated: "One of the pre-
sumptions is, that what is common continues; another, that a fact
the existence of which is once shown, continues. Therefore, where
the general law withholds from the mass of the people the right
to make the particular sale in controversy, and permits it only
to exceptional persons, of every one of whom it is certainly true
that at some time he was not allowed to do it, the prima facie
presumption is double: first, that the instance in controversy ac-
cords with what is general; and secondly, that as at one time the
defendant had no license he has none now. Hence, if he has a
license, he must show it. 1" "To adopt the phraseology of the
Supreme Court of Illinois, it has often been held that 'when a fact
is peculiarly within the knowledge of a party, the burden is on
him to prove such fact whether the proposition be affirmative or
negative.' Thus where one is accused of doing an act which would
be unlawful unless the doer has received a special authority per-
mission of law, the government may properly allege that he has
done the act * * * without license or authority in law. When
the act itself is proved, it may then be required of the defendant
that he himself exhibit and prove his license and authority ;--the
burden of evidence being shifted to him for that purpose. The
short reason for this requirement is that license or authority is a
fact easy for him to prove and difficult for the prosecution to
disprove."'5
The typical air licensing statute is like that mentioned in the
foregoing quotations. The act of operating aircraft is unlawful
unless the craft and the airman be properly licensed. Hence, in
the air license cases, it would seem that the burden of proving
the existence of a license would be on the defendant.16 There
14. Bishop, supra, Sec. 1051. Relative to presumptions, see Chas. T.
McCormick, "Charges on Presumptions and Burden of Proof," supra.
15. Chamberlayne, supra, Sec. 983. (Italics ours.)
16. By statute, in some states, the burden of proving the license is on
the defendant. "In every proceeding under paragraph (a) of this section
an averment that the defendant at the time of the alleged offense was
without the required certificate of registration, shall be taken as true, unless
disproved by the defendant." State v. Etzenhouser, 16 S. W. (2d) 656(Mo. 1929-Practice of Optometry) ; and see State v. Rosasco, 103 Or. 343,
205 P. 290 (1922-liquor).
Court decisions, to the same effect, are to be found in State v. Schmail,
25 Minn. 370 (1879-liquor) ; Durfee v. State, 53 Neb. '214, 73 N. W. 676
(1897-liquor) ; and State v. Dowell, 195 N. C. 523, 143 S. E. 133 (1928-
liquor).
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are at least three reasons given for placing the burden on the de-
fendant: (1) Since the act of flying is unlawful unless one be
possessed of a license, anyone who operated aircraft would be
prima facie committing an unlawful act and must demonstrate his
special authority.'7  (2) The subject matter of the negative aver-
ment-possession or non-possession of the license-lies peculiarly
within the knowledge of the defendant;I and (3) The difficulty
of the state in proving the negative averment, especially when a
public interest is involved."" Objection has been made to the first
reason advanced on the ground that, by a parity of reasoning it
could be said to be unlawful for one to vote unless he were an
American citizen. A most excellent statement of the rationale of
the problem occurs in the case of Rex v. Turner,20 wherein Bay-
ley, J., says:
"I have always understood it to be a general rule, that if a negative
averment be made by one party, which is peculiarly within the knowledge
of the other, the party within whose knowledge it lies, and who asserts
the affirmative is to prove it, and not he who avers the negative. And if
we consider the reason of the thing in this particular case, we cannot but
see that it is next to impossible that the witness for the prosecution should
be prepared to give any evidence of the defendant's want of qualification.
If, indeed, it is to be presumed, that he must be acquainted with the de-
fendant, and with his situation or habits in life, then he might give general
evidence what those were; but if, as it is more probable, he is unac-
quainted with any of these matters, how is he to form any judgment
whether he is qualified or not, from his appearance only? Therefore, if
the law were to require that the witness should depose negatively to these
things, it seems to me, that it might lead to the encouragement of much
hardihood of swearing. The witness would have to depose .to a multitude
of facts; he must swear that the defendant has not an estate in his own
or his wife's right, of a certain value; that he is not the son and heir
apparent of an esquire, etc.; but how is it at all probable, that a witness
should be likely to depose with truth to such minutiae? On the other hand,
there is no hardship in casting the burden of the affirmative proof on the
defendant, because he must be presumed to know his own qualification, and
to be able to prove it. If the defendant plead to the information, that he
is a qualified person, arid require time to substantiate his plea in evidence,
it is a matter of course for the justices to postpone the hearing, in order
17. Chamberlayne, supra, Sec. 983, note 7.
18. Greenleaf, supra, Sec. 79. See criticism of this ground, Wigmore,
supra, Sec. 2486.
19. Rex v. Turner, 5 M. S. 206 (1816-game-law), particularly the
opinion of Lord Ellenborough; People v. Ross, 60 Cal. App. 163, 212 P.
627 (1922--concealed weapons); Smith v. Commonwealth, 196 Ky. 188, 244
S. W. 407 (1922-liquor); and Commonwealth v. Thurlow, 24 Pick. (Mass.)
374, 380 (1840-liquor).
20. 5 M. & S. 206 (1816-game-law).
PROSECUTION OF UNLICENSED FLYING CASES
to afford him time, and an opportunity of proving his qualifications. But
if the onus of proving the negative is to lie on the other party, it seems
to me, that it will be the cause of many offenders escaping conviction. I
cannot help thinking, therefore, that the onus must lie on the defendant,
and that when the prosecutor has proved everything, which, but for the
defendant's being qualified, would subject the defendant to the penalty, he
has done enough; and the proof of qualification is to come in as matter of
defense."
The state, of course, must prove the act of flying by the de-
fendant21 but, having done that, the burden, according to the rule
in the great majority of states, is upon the defendant.2 2
21. People v. Gillett, 243 Ill. App. 41, 51 (1926-securities law) ; Smith
v. Commonwealth, 196 Ky. 188, 244 S. W. 407 (1922-liquor); State v.
Dowell, 195 N. C. 523, 143 S. E. 133 (1928-liquor).
22. FEDERAL--Farone v. United States, 259 F. 507 (1919-liquor).
AIABAMA-Porter & Co. v. State, 58 Ala. 66 (1877-dealers in pistols,
bowie and dirk knives) ; Isbell v. State, 17 Ala. App. 465, 86 S. 169 (1920-
two-horse wagon on street) ; Samples v. State, 19 Ala. Appl. 478, 98 S. 211,
aff'd 210 Ala. 544 (1923-practicing dentistry).
ARKANSAs-Clark v. State, 155 Ark. 16, 243 S. W. 865 (1922-liquor).
CALIFORNI-People V. Boo Doo Hong, 122 Cal. 606, 55 P. 402 (1898-
practicing medicine) ; People v. T. Wah fling, 47 Cal. App. 327, 190 P. 662
(1920); People v. Goscinsky, 52 Cal. App. 62, 198 P. 40 (1921-practicing
medicine) ; People v. Ross, 60 Cal. App. 163, 212 P. 627 (1922-concealed
weapon); People v. Quarez, 196 Cal. 404, 238 P. 363 (1925-concealed
weapons by foreign-born).
ILLINOIs-Noecker v. People, 91 Ill. 468 (1879-liquor) ; People v. Ned-
row, 16 Ill. App. 192 (1884--pharmacy) ; Williams v. People, 121 Ill. 84, 11
N. E. 881 (1887-practicing medicine); Kettles v. People, 221 Ill. 221, 77
N. E. 472 (1906-practicing dentistry); Abhau v. Grassie, 262 Ill. 636, 104
N. E. 1020, Ann. Cas. 1915 B. 414 (1914-contractor claiming mechanic's
lien--cited for important dictum) ; People v. Montgomery, 271 Ill. 580,
111 N. E. 578 (1916-sale of drugs); People v. Gillett, 243 Ill. App. 41
(1926--securities law) ; People v. Talbot, 322 Ill. 416, 153 N. E. 693 (1926-
liquor) ; People v. Hollenbeck, 322 111. 443, 153 N, E. 691 (1926-liquor);
People v. DeGeovanni, 326 Ill. 230, 157 N. E. 195 (1927-liquor).
INDIANA-Benham v. State, 116 Ind. 112, 18 N. E. 454 (1888-medicine).
IowA-State ex rel. Woodbury Co. Anti-Saloon League v. Clark, 189
Ia. 492, 178 N. W. 419 (1920-House of prostitution-want of knowledge).
KENTUCKY-Smith v. Commonwealth, 196 Ky. 188, 244 S. W. 407 (1922-
liquor).
MASSACHUSETTs-Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 141 Mass. 420, 6. N. E.
102 (1886---billiard table).
MINNESOTA-State V. Schmail, 25 Minn. 370 (1879-liquor); State v.
Bach, 36 Minn. 234, 30 N. W. 764 (1886-liquor).
Missousi-State v. Liscomb, 52 Mo. 32 (1873-liquor) ; State v. Parsons,
124 Mo. 436, 27 S. W. 1102 (1894-peddling) ; City of St. Louis v. Weitzel,
130 Mo. 600, 31 S. W. 1045 (1895-garbage removal; State v. Quinn,
170 Mo. 176, 67 S. W. 974 (1902-liquor) ; State v. Etzenhouser, 16 S. W.
(2d) 656 (1929-optometry).
NmRASA-Durfee v. State, 53 Neb. 214, 73 N. W. 676 (1897-liquor).
NEw HAMPSHIRE-State V. Simons, 17 N. H. 83 (1845-liquor) ; State v.
McGlynn, 34 N. H. 422 (1857-liquor); Spilene v. Salmon Falls Mfg. Co.,
79 N. H. 326, 108 A. 808 (1920-employer's Liab. Act). For mention of the
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While the argument ab inconvenienti is a sound one 28 there
are some decisions which hold that it must be used sparingly.24
That is, there is insistence upon the point that, where the proof is
equally accessible to both parties, the state must furnish proof even
if the defendant could more easily offer his evidence. However, it is
recognized that the "convenience" rule is particularly applicable to
prosecutions for practicing some profession or following some call-
ing without the license provided therefor by law. 25
There exists, or has existed, some authority to the contrary
conflicting New Hampshire opinions, see Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 2486,
Note 4, and cases cited.
NEW JERSEY-State V. City of Camden, 48 N. J. L. 89, 2 A. 668 (1886-
liquor).
NEW YORK-People v. Rontney, 4 N. Y. S. 235, aff'd. 117 N. Y. 624
(1889-pharmacy-dictum); People v. Maxwell, 83 Hun (N. Y.) 157, 31
N. Y. S. 564 (1894-liquor).
NORTH CAROLINA-State v. MorrLson, 14 N. C. 299 (1831-liquor) ; State
v. Emery, 98 N. C. 668, 3 S. E. 636 (1887-1Uquor) ; State v. Morrison, 126
N. C. 1123, 36 S. E. 329 (1900-selling pianos and organs) State v. Valley,
187 N. C. 571, 122 S. E. 373 (1924-procuring laborers); Speas v. Mer-
chants' Bk. & Trust Co. of Winston-Salem, 188 N. C. 524, 125 S. E. 398
(1924-usury) ; State v. Dowell, 195 N. C. 523, 143 S. E. 133 (1928--pos-
session of liquor, apart from license). See note on this last case by
C. T. McCormick, in 7 No. Car. L. Rev. 41 (1928).
OPEGON-State v. Rosasco, 103 Or. 343, 205 P. 290 (1922-liquor).
PHILIPPINES-U. S. v. Gonzales, 10 Phil. 66 (1908-opium smoking).
SOUTH CAROLINA-Gueing v. State, 1 McCord (S. C.) 573 (1822-
liquor); Information against Oliver, 21 S. C. 318, 6 Am. Rep. 681 (1884-
publishing newspaper); State v. Deadwyler, 133 S. C. 75, 130 S. E. 332
(1925-medicine).
TEXAs-Bell v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. R. 242. 137 S. W. 670, 36 L. R. A.
N. S. 98, Ann. Cas. 1913 C. 617 (1911-liquor).
UrAH-Salt Lake City v. Robinson, 40 Utah 448, 125 P. 657 (1912-
liquor).
WEST VIRGINIA-State V. Horner, 52 W. Va. 373, 48 S. E. 89 (1903--
pharmacy).
WISCOSIN-Piper v. State, 202 Wis. 58, 231 N. W. 162 (1930-medicine).
ENGLAND--Rex v. Smith, 3 Bur. 1475 (1764-pedler) ; Rex v. Hoseason,
14 East 604, 606 (1811-liquor); Rex v. Turner, 5 M. & S. 206 (1816-
hunting game) ; Rex v. Hanson, 4 B. & Ald. 519, 106 Eng. Rep. 1027 (1821-
liquor); Apoth. Co. v. Bentley, Ry. & M. N. P. C. 159, 171 Eng. Rep. 978
(1824-apothecary).
"Onus of Proof of Being Licensed," 73 The Solicitors' Journal 183(1929).
See note, 36 L. R. A. N. S. 98 (1911) ; Jones, Evidence, Sec. 497, note
8 for list of state cases, and Bishop, Statutory Crimes, Sec. 1052, for a
fairly complete list of state authorities. Relative to license cases in civil
actions, see note, 8 L. R. A. N. S. 1238 (1907).
The general rules, previously stated, do not apply where the state
might establish the same fact by secondary evidence. Wharton, Criminal
Evidence, Sec. 341.
23. See footnote 19, supra.
24. People v. Frey, 165 Cal. 140, 145; 131 P. 127, quoted in People v.
Quarez, 196 Cal. 404, 238 P. 363, 366 (1925); Commonwealth v. Thurlow,
24 Pick. (Mass.) 374, 381 (1840).
25. People v. Frey, supra.
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which places the burden, or some burden, upon the state. In
Kansas, there are opinions to the effect that the state must estab-
lish a prima facie case and prove by competent evidence that the
defendant had no permit at the time of the commission of the
alleged offense.26  The theory of these cases is that, since proof
is equally available to both parties, there is no hardship placed
upon the state. Thus, in one case, 7 the court says:
"It may be that, where the knowledge of the existence of the license,
and the proof of the same, are peculiarly within the possession of the de-
fendant, that the rules of evidence would require that the defendant should
produce the license; but where the reason upon which such rule is founded
fails, the rule itself must fail-that is, where the knowledge of the existence
or non-existence of the license, and the proof of such existence or non-
existence, can be obtained as easily by the prosecution as by the defense,
it should certainly devolve upon the prosecution to produce such proof,
whenever the non-existence of the license is essentially necessary to the
case of the prosecution. This view of the question, we think, is in accord-
ance with the later and better-reasoned decisions."
For some reason, probably based upon convenience, the old stat-
ute was amended in 1885 so as to place the burden upon the de-
fendant. The new provision reads:
"In prosecutions under this act, by indictment or otherwise, . . . it
shall not be necessary in the first instance for the state to prove that the
party charged did not have a permit to sell intoxicating liquors for the
excepted purposes. .. ,2
Since the legislative change, and the amendment has been upheld,
it is no longer necessary in Kansas for the state to make out a
prima facie case.2 1
Commonwealth v. ThurloW,80 a Massachusetts case, held that
where the county commissioners were required by law to keep
a record of liquor licenses and where the record was equally
accessible to both parties, the state must produce evidence as to
the non-existence of the license. Subsequently, a statute pro-
vided: "A defendant in a criminal prosecution relying for his
justification upon a license, appointment, admission as an attorney
at law or authority, shall prove the same, and until so proved the
presumption shall be that he is not so authorized.""'
26. The Territory v. Reyburn, 1 Kans. 551 (1860-ferry license) ; State
v. Kuhuke, 26 Kan. 405 (1881-liquor); State v. Schweiter, 27 Kan. 499
(1882-liquor) ; State v. Nye, 32 Kan. 201, r P. 134 (1884-liquor).
27. State v. Kuhuke, supra, p. 409.
28. Revised Statutes of Kansas, 1925, Ch. 21, Art. 21, Sec. 2121.
29. State v. Crow, 53 Kan. 662 (1894-liquor).
30. Commonwealth v. Thurlow, 24 Pick (Mass.) 374 (1840).
31. General Laws of Mass., 1921, Ch. 278, Sec. 7.
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A dissenting opinion in a Texas liquor case strongly urged
that the burden should rest upon the state, 82 but the majority held
otherwise. However, in a later case,83 the court held that a statute
did place the burden of proof upon the state. In that case, which
involved the practice of medicine without a license, the statute
provided:
"The holder of the certificate must have the same recorded upon each
change of residence to another county, and the absence of such record shall
be prima facie evidence of the want of possession of such certificate.'!83
In explaining its decision, the court said:
"There was no evidence introduced to the effect that appellant's authority
had not been registered as required by the statute. It is not unlawful to
practice medicine, but it is unlawful to do so without compliance with the
statute. The offense is the practice of medicine without compliance with
the statute, and the burden is upon the state to prove the offense. There
will be found decisions of other states holding, under certain circumstances,
the burden of making proof of authority to practice medicine is not upon
the state because a fact within the peculiar knowledge of the accused.
30 Cyc. 1567. Such is not the case here, as the statute itself prescribes a
rule of evidence making the absence of the record prima facie evidence of
the want of such certificate, and requiring that the certificate be recorded
in the county in which the accused is residing at the time renders it easy
for the state to make the proof of records of the particular county. The
failure to make the proof in this instance characterizes the evidence as in-
sufficient."3 5
The statute of itself imposes no obligation upon the state; it
merely codifies the common law principle relative to oral evidence
of the non-existence of a license. The theory of Denton v. State,8"
consequently, must be based, like the Kansas cases, upon the fact
that no hardship is thereby placed upon the state. The Denton
case does not mention Bell v. State,87 decided by the same court in
1911, nor does it refer to the Texas statute which provides that
"When the facts have been proved which constitute the offense, it devolves
32. Bell v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. R. 242, 137 S. W. 670, 36 L. R. A. N. S.
98, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 617 (1911). Dissenting opinion of Davidson, P. J.
33. Denton v. State, 83 Tex. Cr. R. 67, 201 S. W. 183 (1918-medicine)
followed in Reum v. State, 84 Tex. Cr. R. 225, 206 S. W. 523 (1918-
medicine). See, also, Dozier v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. R. 258, 137 S. W. 679
(1911-liquor) ; Miller v. State, 77 Tex. Cr. R. 258, 178 S. W. 367 (1915--
liquor).
34. Revised Crim. Statutes of Texas, 1925, Title 12, Ch. 6, Art. 739.
35. Denton v. State, supra, p. 184.
36. Note 33 supra.
37. Note 22, supra.
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upon the accused to establish the facts or circumstances on which he relies
to excuse or justify the prohibited act or omission."'8
The statute is obviously ambiguous, but was the basis for the
earlier decision in Bell v. State. If the decision in the Denton
case rests upon the "lack of hardship" theory, it could not serve
as precedent for an unlicensed flying case because there the state
has no easy method of presenting proof, due to the fact that the
license records are maintained at Washington.
The early Wisconsin cases held that the state must show by
presumptive evidence that the defendant had no license, 9 but, by
dictum at least, the later cases are in line with the majority of
states in placing the onus probandi upon the defendant. 0
There is an additional reason, in the aviation license cases,
for placing the burden upon the defendant. The aviation statutes
almost uniformly contain a provision which requires the possession
and display of licenses. A typical statute reads as follows:
"Sec. 4. Possession and display of licenses: The certificate of the
license required for pilots shall be kept in the personal possession of the
licensee when he is operating aircraft within this State and must be pre-
sented for inspection upon the demand of any passenger, or any peace officer
of this State, any authorized official or employee of the Illinois aeronautics
commission or any official, manager, or person in charge of any airport in
this State upon which he shall land, or upon the reasonable request of any
other person. The aircraft license must be carried in the aircraft at all
times and must be conspicuously posted therein where it may be readily seen
by passengers or inspectors; and such license must be presented for in-
spection upon the demand of any passenger, any peace officer of this State,
any authorized official or employee of the Illinois aeronautics commission
or any official, manager, or person in charge of any airport in this State
upon which it shall land, or upon the reasonable request of any other
person."41
It would, of course, be possible to prosecute for failure to
properly display a license, but, if that were the only charge and
if the defendant could show that he possessed a license but had
38. Revised Criminal Statutes of Texas, 1925, Title I, Ch. 3, Art. 46;
White's Annotated Penal Code of Texas, 1901, Title I, Ch. 3, Art. 52,
Sec. 81; White's Code of Criminal Procedure, 1900, Title VIII, Ch. 7, Art.
796, Sec. 1058, note 6.
39. Mehan v. State, 7 Wis. 670 (1859-liquor) ; Hepler v. State, 58 Wis.
46, 16 N. W. 42 (1883-liquor).
40. Ex parte Kreutser, 187 Wis. 463, 204 N. W. 595 (1925-Blue Sky
Law) ; and particularly Piper v. State, 202 Wis. 58, 231 N. W. 162 (1930-
practicing medicine).
41. An Act to Regulate Aeronautics, approved July 9, 1931; Laws of
Illinois, Fifty-seventh General Assembly, 1931, p. 194; Smith-Hurd Illinois
Revised Statutes, 1931, Ch. 15 .
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merely neglected to display or carry it, the court would be pre-
disposed to be lenient with him. The display o f licenses is required
for general convenience, but the operation of aircraft without plane
and pilot's licenses is the principal evil to be curbed. Consequently,
it is desirable to base a prosecution upon the unlicensed flying
rather than upon any technicality relative to display of license.
Since it is usually impossible to introduce a certificate of the
non-existence of a license, and since it is virtually impossible to
bring the federal custodian of aviation licenses into a case, it
would seem desirable to obviate the difficulty by additional legisla-
tion--despite the fact that the great majority of states, in other
license cases, place the burden of proving a license upon the de-
fendant. An additional paragraph could be added to the "display"
requirement, to read as follows:
"In any criminal prosecution under any of the provisions of this act,
a defendant who relies for his justification upon a license of any kind
,shall have the burden of proving that he is properly licensed, or is the
possessor of a proper license, as the case may be."
